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Abstract 
Cloud computing offers scalable on-demand services toconsumers with greater flexibility and lesser infrastructure investment. 
Since Cloud services are delivered using classical network protocols and formats over the Internet, implicit vulnerabilities 
existent in these protocols as well as threats introduced by newer architectures raise many securityand privacy concerns. In 
this paper, we survey factors affecting Cloud computing adoption, vulnerabilities,and attacks, and identify relevant solution 
directives to strengthen security and privacyin Cloud environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing has emerged as a way for IT businesses to increase capabilities on the fly without investing 
much in new infrastructure, training of personals or licensing new software [1]. NIST defines Cloud computing 
as a "model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and delivered with minimal managerial effort or service 
provider interaction” [2]. It follows a simple “pay as you go” model, which allows an organization to pay for only 
the service they use. It eliminates the need to maintain an in-house data center by migrating enterprise data to a 
remote location at the Cloud provider’s site. Minimal investment, cost reduction and rapid deployment are main 
factors that drive industries to utilize Cloud servicesand allow them to focus on core business concerns and 
priorities rather than dealing with technical issues. According to [3], 91% of the organizations in US and Europe 
agreed that reduction in cost is a major reason for them to migrate to Cloud environment. 
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As shown in Fig. 1, Cloud services are offered in terms of Infrastructure (IaaS), Platform (PaaS) and Software 
(SaaS). It follows a bottom up approach wherein at the infrastructure level; machine power is delivered in terms 
of CPU consumption to memory allocation. On top of it, lies the layer that delivers an environment in terms of 
framework for application development, termed as PaaS. At the top level resides the application layer, delivering 
software outsourced through the Internet, eliminating the need for in-house maintenance of sophisticated 
software[4]. At application layer, the end users can utilize software running at a remote site by Application 
service providers (ASPs). Here, customers need not to buy and install costly software. They can again pay for 
only they use and their concerns for maintenanceare cut off.  All the software or applications are kept under the 
control of service provider.  
Fig. 1.Cloud service stack. 
1.1. Need for Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is a merger of several known technologies including grid and distributed computing, 
utilizing Internet as a service delivery network. Public Cloud environment is extremely complex when compared 
to a traditional data center environment [2]. Under the paradigm of Cloud computing, an organization surrenders 
  
3 
direct control over major aspects of security, conferring a substantial level of trust onto the Cloudprovider. A 
survey regarding use of Cloud services made by IDC says that security is the greatest challenge of the Cloud as 
shown in Fig. 2 [5]. 
 
Fig. 2.Results of IDC ranking security challenges [5]. 
 
Virtual environments areused in Cloud to achieve multi-tenancy. Vulnerabilities in virtual machines [6] pose 
direct threat to the privacy and security of the Cloud services. Factors crippling usage of Cloud services are live 
migration of data over the Internet, entrusting a provider for data security and privacy, vulnerabilities at 
browser’s API, vulnerabilities in network, export regulations for encryption etc.  
Shared and distributed resources in Cloud systems make it difficult to develop security model for ensuring the 
data security and privacy. Due of transparency issues, no Cloud provider allows its customers to implement 
intrusion detection or security monitoring system extending into the management services layer behind 
virtualized Cloud instances. Customers may not be aware of detailed security-incidents, vulnerability, or malware 
reports. For example, through back channel, attackers may be able to access the content of Cloud instances and 
fix a kernel level rootkit [7]. Attacks on “physical level” such as reading out the random access memory of the 
virtualized hosts or subverting the virtualization layer [8], are known to the community. Even the host system 
providing the data can no longer be fully trusted since Cloud provider owns the physical resources.  
Cloud service providers often establish a Service Level Agreement (SLA) to highlight security and privacy of 
the related service. To an extent, there is a lack of a standard methodology to design a SLA. The authors in [9] 
presented SLA about provided services and the waivers. These waivers do not really help the customers fulfilling 
their losses. Cloud providers like Amazon, Google, Salesforce etc. rely on detailed SLAs to guarantee security 
and other parameters for customers. E.g., Amazon’s EC2 provides abstraction of virtual hardware to its users, 
covering all types of failures including operator node failure and software node failure [10]. In future, SLA based 
Google App Engine would likely to manage all causes of failures. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses vulnerabilities, threats and attacks relevant to 
Cloud. A survey on security issues at different levels inCloud and their existing solutions are provided in section 
3. Section 4discussesresearch directionswith conclusionsand references at the end. 
2. Vulnerabilities, Threats and Attacks to Cloud Computing 
In Cloud, existing vulnerabilities, threats and associated attacks raises several security concerns. 
Vulnerabilities in Cloud can be defined as the loopholes in security architecture of Cloud,which can be exploited 
by an adversary via sophisticated techniques to gain access of network and other resources. A threat in Cloud is a 
potential (or actual adverse) event, that may be malicious or incidental (such as the failure of a storage device), 
compromising Cloud resources [11]. An attack is an action to harm Cloud resources. Exploitation of 
vulnerabilities would affect the availability and productivity of Cloud computing. 
2.1. Vulnerabilities in Cloud Environment 
In this section, we discuss major vulnerabilities specific to Cloud, which pose serious threats to Cloud 
computing. 
2.1.1. Vulnerabilities in virtualization/ multi tenancy 
Virtualization/ multi-tenancy serves as the basis for Cloud computing architecture. There are mainly three 
types of virtualization are used: OS level virtualization, application based virtualization, and Hpervisor based 
virtualization.  In OS level virtualization, multiple guest OSs are running on a hosting OS that has visibility and 
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control on each guest OS.  In such type of configuration, attacker can get control on the entire guest OSs by 
compromising the host OS. In application based virtualization, virtualization is enabled on the top layer of host 
OS. In this type of configuration, each VM has its guest OS and related applications. Application based 
virtualization also suffers from same vulnerability as in OS based vulnerabilities. Hypervisor or virtual machine 
monitor (VMM) that is just like code embedded to host OS. Such code may contain native errors. This code is 
available at boot time of host OS to control of multiple guest OSs. If hypervisor is compromised, then the entire 
controlled guest OSs can be compromised. Vulnerabilities in virtualization or hypervisor allows attacker to 
perform cross-VM side-channel attacks and DoS attacks. For instance, a malformed code in Microsoft’s Hyper-V 
is run by an authenticated user in one of the VM caused a DoS attack [53].  In VMware Workstation, an attacker 
cause an error to store some malformed data, which enabled a DoS attack on the host OS. 
Cloud providers thrive to maintain maximum level of isolation between Virtual machine (VM) instances 
including isolation between inter user processes. By compromising the lower layer hypervisor, attacker can gain 
control over installed VMs. BLUEPILL [12], SubVirt [13] and DKSM [14] are attack examples on virtual layer. 
Through these attacks, hackers can able to modify the installed hypervisor and gain control over the host.  
Another incident is vulnerability found in the memory management of Microsoft virtual pc. This has resulted 
into user programs running in guest Operating system getting read/write access to bypass security mechanisms 
like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Safe Structured Error Handling (SafeSEH) and Address Space Layout 
Randomization (ASLR)[15]. Input validation error in Xencan be exploited by root user of a guest domain to 
execute arbitrary commands in domain 0 (Host domain). 
2.1.2. Vulnerabilities in Internet protocol  
Vulnerabilities in Internet protocols may prove to be an implicit way of attacking Cloud system, that include 
common types of attacks like man-in-the-middle attack, IP spoofing, ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning, RIP attacks 
and flooding. ARP poisoning is the one of the known vulnerabilities in Internet protocols. Using this 
vulnerability, malicious VM can redirect all the inbound/outbound traffic of a co-located VM to the malicious 
VM since ARP does not require Proof-of-Origin. HTTP is a web application protocol that requires session state. 
Many techniques are used for session handling. However, they are vulnerable to session-riding and session 
hijacking. These vulnerabilities are certainly relevant to Cloud.TCP/IP has some “unfixable flaws” such as 
“trusted machine” status of machines that have been in contact with each other, and tacit assumption that routing 
tables on routers will not be maliciously altered [16].Such attack scenario becomes critical for public Clouds, as 
the general backbone for Cloud provision is the Internet. 
2.1.3. Unauthorized access to management interface 
In Cloud, users have to manage their subscription including Cloud instance, data upload or data computation 
through a management interface e.g. AWS management console [17]. Unauthorized access to such a management 
interface may become very critical for a Cloud system. Unlike traditional system, higher number of 
administrators and users for a Cloud system increases probability for unauthorized access. Advances in crypto 
analysis breaks security provided by cryptographic algorithms, which may turns strong encryption into weak 
encryption. Insecure or out dated cryptography vulnerabilities are also relavant to Cloud since it is not thinkable 
to use Cloud without using cryptography to protect data security and privacy in the cloud. For example, a 
cryptographic hole discovered in Amazon’sEC2 management interface by performing signature-wrapping and 
cross site scripting (XSS) attacks, where interfaces used to manage Cloud resources are hijacked. Such attacks 
allow attackers to create, modify and delete machine images, and change administrative passwords and 
settings[18].Recent research [19]has shown that, successfully attacking a Cloud control interface can allows an 
attacker to gain a complete power over an account including all stored data. 
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2.1.4. Injection vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities like SQL injection flaw, OS injection flaw and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
injection flaw are used to disclose application components. Such vulnerabilities are outcome of defects in design 
and architecture of applications. These data may be of organization’s applications or private data of other 
organization’s applications residing on same Cloud. 
2.1.5. Vulnerabilities in browsers and APIs 
Cloud providers expose a set of software interfaces (or APIs)that customer can use to manage and interact 
with Cloud services. Service provisioning, management, orchestration, and monitoring are performed using these 
interfaces via client (e.g. Web browser). Security and availability of Cloud services depend on the security of 
these APIs. Examples of browser based attacks (HTML based services) are- SSL certificate spoofing, attacks on 
browser caches and phishing attacks on mail clients [20]. APIs should support all key agreement methods 
specified in WS-Security family of standards, since the resulting keys must be stored directly in the browser. This 
could be done by enhancing security of APIs, e.g. PKCS#11. 
For providing security to Cloud services and resources, these vulnerabilities should be tested (and removed) 
before delivering Cloud services to user. In Table 1, we summarize vulnerabilities relevant to Cloud and their 
associated effects. 
 
Table 1.Effects of vulnerabilities in Cloud and consequent effects. 
Vulnerability Consequent effects 
Unauthorized Access to Management 
Interface 
An intruder can gain access control and can take advantage of services to harbor attacks. 
Access to administrative interface can be more critical. 
Vulnerabilities in Internet Protocol Allow network attacks like ARP spoofing, SYN-flood, DoS/DDoS etc. 
Injection Vulnerabilities Unauthorized disclosure of private data behind applications. 
Vulnerabilities in Virtualization Bypassing the security barriers can allow access to underlying hypervisor. 
Vulnerabilities in Browsers and APIs Allow unauthorized service access. 
2.2. Threats to Cloud Computing 
Cloud security alliance in [20] presented a primary draft for threats relevant to the security architecture of 
Cloud services. We discuss here some potential threats relevant to Cloud and relevant mitigation directives.   
2.2.1. Changes to business model 
Cloud computing changes the way of IT services that are delivered. As servers, storage and applications are 
provided by off-site external service providers, organizations need to evaluate the risks associated with the loss of 
control over the infrastructure. Data traversing over geographical boundaries are subjected to different federal 
laws. This is a prime threat which hinders the usage of Cloud computing services. A reliable end-to-end 
encryption and appropriate trust management scheme can simplify such threat to some extent. 
2.2.2. Abusive use of Cloud computing 
Cloud computing provides several utilities including bandwidth and storage capacities. Some vendors also 
give a predefined trial period to use their services. However, they do not have sufficient control over attackers, 
malicious users, spammers that can take advantages of trials. These can often allow an intruder to plant a 
malicious attack and prove to be a platform for strong attacks. Areas of concern include password and key 
cracking, launching dynamic attack points, DDOS, Captcha solving farms etc. Such threats affect the IaaS and 
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PaaS service models. For protection, initial registration should be through proper validation/verification and 
through stronger authentication. User’s network traffic should be monitored comprehensively. 
2.2.3. Insecure interfaces and API 
Cloud provider often exposes a set of APIs to allow its customers to design an interface for interacting with 
Cloud service. These interfaces often add a layer on top of the framework, which in turn would increase the 
complexity of Cloud. Such interfaces allow vulnerabilities (in the existent API) to move to the Cloud 
environment. Improper use of such interfaces would often pose threats such as clear-text authentication, 
transmission of content, improper authorizations etc. Such type of threat may affect the IaaS, PaaS and SaaS 
service models. This can be avoided by using proper security model for Cloud provider’s interface and ensuring 
strong authentication and access control mechanism with encrypted transmission. 
2.2.4. Malicious insiders 
Most of the organizations hide their own policies regarding the level of access to employees, recruitment 
procedure for employees. However, using higher level of access, an employee can gain access to confidential 
data and services. Due to lack of transparency into Cloud provider’s process and procedure, insiders often have 
the privilege. Insider activities are often bypassed by a firewall or Intrusion Detection system (IDS) assuming it 
to be a legal activity. Trusted insider may turn into an adversary. In such a situation, insiders can cause 
considerable effect on Cloud service offerings. E.g. malicious insiders can access confidential data and gain 
control over the Cloud services with no risk of detection [20]. This type of threat may be relevant to SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. To avoid this, more transparency is required into security and management process including 
compliance reporting and breach notification.  
2.2.5. Shared technology/ Multi-tenancy nature 
In multi-tenant architecture, virtualization is used to offer shared on-demand services. Same application is 
shared among different user having VM access. But as presented earlier, vulnerabilities in a hypervisor allow 
malicious user to gain access and control of legitimate users’ VMs. IaaS services are delivered using shared 
resources, which may not be designed to provide strong isolation for multi-tenant architectures. This may affect 
the overall architecture of Cloud by allowing one tenant to interfere into the other and affecting its normal 
operation. This type of threat affects IaaS. Implementation of SLA for patching, strong authentication and access 
control to administrative tasks are some of the solutions to address this issue.  
2.2.6. Data loss and leakage  
Data may be compromised in many ways. This may include data compromise, deletion or modification. Due 
to dynamic and shared nature of the Cloud, such threat could prove to be a major issue leading to data theft. 
Examples of such threats are lack of authentication, authorization and audit control, weak encryption algorithms, 
weak keys, risk of association, unreliable datacenter, and lack of disaster recovery. This threat can be applicable 
to SaaS, PaaS and IaaS. Solutions include security of API, data integrity, secure storage for used keys, data 
backup and retention policies etc [20].  
2.2.7. Service hijacking 
Service hijacking may lead to redirect client to an illegitimate website. User accounts and service instances 
could in turn make a new base for attackers. Phishing attack, fraud, exploitation of software vulnerabilities, 
reused credentials and passwords may pose service or account hijacking. This threat affects IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. 




2.2.8. Risk profiling 
Cloud offerings make organizations less involved with ownership and maintenance of H/W and S/W. This 
offers significant advantages. However, this makes them unaware ofinternal security procedures, security 
compliance, hardening, patching, auditing and logging process etc and expose organization to greater risk. To 
avoid it, Cloud provider should disclose partial infrastructure details, logs and data. There should be monitoring 
and alerting system.  
2.2.9. Identity theft 
Identity theft is a form of fraud in which someone pretends to be someone else, to access resources or obtain 
credit and other benefits. The victim (of identity theft) can suffer adverse consequences and losses and held 
accountable for the perpetrator's actions. Relevant security risks include weak password recovery workflows, 
phishing attacks,key loggers etc. This affects SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. Solution is to use strong authentication 
mechanism. 
In Table 2, we summarize threats to Cloud and directives to avoid them. 
2.3. Attacks on Cloud Computing 
By exploiting vulnerabilities in Cloud, adversary can be able to launch the following attacks on Cloud 
computing. 
2.3.1. Zombie attack 
Through Internet, an attacker tries to flood the victim by sending requests from innocent hosts in the network. 
This type of hosts called zombies. In Cloud, the requests for Virtual Machines (VMs) are accessible by each user 
through the Internet. Attacker can flood the large number of requests via zombies. Such an attack interrupts the 
expected behavior of Cloud affecting availability of Cloud services. Cloud may be overloaded to serve a number 
of requests and exhausted, which cause DoS (Denial of Service) or DDoS (distributed denial of service) to the 
servers. Cloud in the presence of attacker’s flooded requests cannot serve valid user’s requests. Better 
authentication/authorization and IDS/IPS can provide protection against such an attack. 
In the presence of flooding or zombie attack, Cloud provider provides more computational power to serve the 
huge number of requests (including zombie requests). By attacking on a single server, the attacker can cause an 
unavailability of service. Such an attack is called DoS attack. It may affect other services. If server’s resources 
are completely exhausted by processing the flood requests, other service instances on the same server are no 
longer able to perform their intended tasks. Finally, whole Cloud system reaches a state of full loss and cannot be 
able to serve any service request coming from valid users. Such type of distributed attack is called DDoS attack. 
A denial of service attack against BitBucket.org, a code hosting site, caused an outage of over 19hours of 
downtime during an apparent denial of service attack on the Amazon Cloud infrastructure [21]. If an attacker 
cannot be identified, the flooded service raises the user bill for the workload caused by the attacker. To prevent 




Table 2.Summary of threats to Cloud and solution directives. 







Loss of control over Cloud infrastructure. SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 






Allows intruder to launch strongerattacks due to 
anonymous signup, lack of validation, service fraud, 
and ad-hoc services.  
PaaS and 
IaaS. 




Poses threats like clear-text authentication, 
transmission of content; improper authorizations etc. 
SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 
 Ensure strong authentication and access control 
mechanism with encrypted transmission. 
Malicious 
insiders 
Insider malicious activity bypassing firewall and 
other security model. 
SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 
 Provide transparency to security and 





Allows one user to interfere other users’ services by 
compromising hypervisor. 
IaaS.  Use strong authentication and access control 








 Use secure APIs, encryption algorithms and 
secure keys.  Apply data retention and backup policies. 
Service 
hijacking 
User accounts and service instances could in turn 
make a new base for attackers. 
SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 
 Use security policies, strong authentication 
mechanism and activity monitoring. 
Risk 
profiling 
Internal security procedures, security compliance, 
configuration hardening, patching, auditing and 
logging may be overlooked. 
SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 
 Disclose partial logs, data and infrastructure 




Attacker can get valid user’s identity to access that 
user’s resources; and obtain credit or other benefits 
in that user’s name.   
SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. 
 Use strong passwords and authentication 
mechanism. 
2.3.2. Service injection attack 
Cloud system is responsible for determining and eventually instantiating a free-to-use instance of the 
requested service. The address for accessing that new instance is to be communicated back to the requesting user. 
An adversary tries to inject a malicious service or new virtual machine into the Cloud system and can provide 
malicious service to users. Cloud malware affects the Cloud services by changing (or blocking)Cloud 
functionalities. Consider a case wherein adversary creates his/her malicious services like SaaS,PaaS or IaaS and 
adds it to the Cloud system. If adversary succeeds to do this, then valid requests are redirected to the malicious 
services automatically. To defend against this type of attack, service integrity checking module should be 
implemented. Strong isolation between VMs may disable attacker from injecting malicious code in neighbor’s 
VM. 
2.3.3. Attacks on virtualization 
There are mainly two types of attacks performed over virtualization: VM Escape and Rootkit in hypervisor. 
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VM Escape: In this type of attack, an attacker’s program running in a VM breaks the isolation layer in order to 
run with the hypervisor’s root privileges instead with the VM privileges. This allows attacker to interact directly 
with the hypervisor. Therefore, VMEscape from the isolation is provided by the virtual layer. By VM escape, an 
attacker gets access to the host OS and the other VMs running on the physical machine. 
Rootkit in Hypervisor: VM-based rootkits initiate a hypervisor compromising the existing host OS to a VM. 
The new guest OS considers that it is running as the host OS, with the corresponding control over the resources, 
but it is not there. Hypervisor also creates a cover channel to execute unauthorized code into the system. This 
allows an attacker to control over any VM running on the host machine and to manipulate the activities on the 
system.  
2.3.4. Man-in-the Middle attack 
If secure socket layer (SSL) is not properly configured, then any attacker is able to access the data exchange 
between two parties. In Cloud, attacker can be able to access the data communication among data centers. Proper 
SSL configuration and data communication test between authorized parties can be useful to reduce the risk of 
man-in-the-middle attack. 
2.3.5. Metadata spoofing attack 
In this attack, an adversary modifies or changes service’s WSDL file where descriptions about service instance 
are stored. If the adversary succeeds to interrupt service invocation code from WSDL file at delivering time, then 
this attack can be possible. To disable such an attack, information about services and applications should be kept 
in encrypted form. Strong authentication (and authorization) should be enforcedfor accessing such critical 
information. 
2.3.6. Phishing attack 
Phishing attacks are well known for manipulating a web link and redirecting a user to a false link to get 
sensitive data. In Cloud, it may possible that an attacker use the use the cloud service to host a phishing attack 
siteto hijack account and services of other users in cloud. 
Wrapping attackIn Cloud, user requests of his/her VM using web browser or a thin client. Web server 
generates SOAP message (that contains XML based information that will be exchanged between the server and 
browser) for this request. Before communication between server and browser, such XML based information are 
signed using signature values. All the information regarding destination are contained in SOAP header. In 
wrapping attack, an adversary duplicates the body of the message and sends to the server as a legitimate user 
during the translation of the SOAP message. The signature value in duplicated message and integrity of the 
message will be valid at server.  Finally, an adversary will be able interrupt the Cloud services by running 
malicious code. 
2.3.7. Cross site scripting 
In this type of attack, user enters correct URL of a website and attacker on the other site redirect the user to its 
own website and gets its credentials or sensitive data of the user. This attack allows attacker to perform buffer 
overflows, DOS attacks and malicious software injection in to the web browsers.  
2.3.8. Backdoor channel attack 
It is a passive attack, which allows hackers to gain remote access to the compromised system.Using backdoor 
channels, hackers can be able to control victim’s resources and can make it zombie for attempting DDoS attack. It 
can also be used to disclose the confidential data of victim. Better authentication and isolation between VMs can 




Table 3 summarizes attacks, their effects and mitigation directivTable 3.Summary of attacks onCloud and its mitigation directives. 








 By compromising valid 
user’s VMs.  Through direct/indirect 
flooding to host.  VM level attack/ 
Hypervisor level attack/ 




 Affects service availability.  May account for false 
service usage.. 
 Better authentication and 
authorization.  IDS/IPS.   
Service Injection 
Attack 
 Malicious service injected 
through accessing service 
identification files.  Application level attack/ 
VM level attack. 
PaaS  Malicious service provided 
to user instead of valid 
service.  Affects service integrity. 
 Check service integrity 
using hash function.  Strong isolation between 




VM Escape and 
attack on 
hypervisor 
 By compromising 
hypervisor.  By escaping virtualization 
layer.  VM level attack/ 
Hypervisor level attack 
IaaS  Allows attacker to gain 
control over other user’s 
VM. 
 Use of secure hypervisor.  Monitor activities at 
hypervisor.  VM isolation required.  
Man-in-the 
Middle attack 





 Affects the data security and 
privacy. 




 Modifying web service 
description file such as 
WSDL.  Application level attack. 
SaaS/PaaS  Abnormal behavior of 
deployed services.  Affects service 
confidentiality. 
 Strong isolation between 
VMs. 
Phishing attack  By allowing users to 
access fake web link. 
SaaS/PaaS/
IaaS 
 Affects the privacy of user’s 
sensitive information that 
should not be revealed. 
 Identify the spam mails. 
Wrapping attack  By duplicating body of 
SOAP header where 
authentication information 
are stored. 
SaaS  Allows attacker to intrude 
Cloud service and run 
malicious code. 
 Use proper signature 
mechanism.  Use proper configuration 
of SSL.  
Cross site 
scripting 
 By redirecting user from 
valid URL to attacker’s 
web site. 
SaaS  This allows attacker to 
perform various attacks like 
buffer overflow,  DoS attack 
etc. 
 Use proper configuration 




channel attacks  
 By compromising valid 
user’s VMs.  VM level attack/ 
Hypervisor level attack. 
IaaS  Provides rights for accessing 
victim’s resources.  Can affect the service 
availability and data privacy. 
 Better authentication and 
authorization.  Strong isolation between 
VMs. 
3. Security Issues at Different Levels inCloud 
Above presented threats/attacks directly or indirectly affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of Cloud 
resources as well as services at different layers and raises several security concerns as shown in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, 
we explore each layer (as shown in Fig. 1) of Cloud with associated security concerns. Therefore, we classified 
security concerns based on different levels viz; application level, network level, data storage level, virtualization 
level, authentication and access control level, trust level, compliance, audit & regulations level. Application level 
risks directly affect the security of Cloud applications at user layer. Network level threats or intrusions affect the 
overall security of Cloud services, data as well as physical resources. One can easily gain access of other users 
resources or services by monitoring network traffic in Cloud. Attacks on data storage directly affects the security 
of user’s data (at rest or in-transit) including application data, sensitive data etc. Virtualization level risks 
directly affect the data storage level security and application level security. Authentication and access control 
level risks affects the security of legitimate user’s services and resources. Trust level risks directly affect the 
security of data-in-transit and migrating applications. Auditing, compliance and regulations levels threats 
directly affect the user’s data privacy, confidentiality and integrity.  
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Fig.3.A detailed architecture of Cloud with security concerns at each layer. 
3.1. Application Level Security Issues 
Application  level  security  refers  to  the  usage  of  software  and hardware  resources for providing security 
to applications such that the attackers are not able to get control over applications and make desirable changes to 
their format. Since Web applications and SaaS are tightly coupled in providing Cloud services, the security and 
availability of general cloud services are dependent upon the security of Web browsers, APIs, vulnerability free 
applications. A Web browser is the platform independent client program that is mostly used to access the cloud 
services (SaaS), web applications/pages or web 2.0. It uses SSL/TLS protocols for secure transmission and 
authentication of data. Therefore, attacks on browser based Cloud authentication directly affect the security of 
Cloud applications. Any attacker can get access of other user’s XML tokens (authentication related credentials in 
browser) and accesses the services of victim. One of the solutions viz; XML signature and XML encryption can 
be used to enhance browser security. However, XML Signature Wrapping attack enables attacker to change the 
content of the signed part without invalidating the signature. E.g., Using XML signature wrapping attack (due to 
exploitation of cross-site XSS scripting vulnerabilities), it is possible to hijack some live Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) accounts (that uses SOAP and REST interfaces) [54].Therefore XML signature or XML Encryption fails 
to provide browser level security. To address wrapping attack, authors in [55] recommended the use of a 
redundant bit (STAMP bit) with the SOAP header. If any adversary infers the message during transmission, the 
STAMP will be changed. At server side, first STAMP bit is checked and if changed STAMP bit is found, then in 
the browser, new signature value is generated that sent back to the server to modify the authenticity checking. 
Using this approach, an adversary cannot interrupt the customer request with a duplication of the SOAP message 
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because the previous signature value is already altered. For this purpose, only a random signature value generator 
is needed in the browser end and only the extra message overhead of one bit is required for an authenticity check. 
However, such approaches are not applied to current Cloud systems and it is still an open challenge to provide a 
sufficient browser level security. 
L. Hu et al. [56] presented an ontology-based Semantic Access Control Policy Language (SACPL) for 
describing access control policies (ACPs) in cloud computing environment. In this approach, syntax elements of 
XACML, such as subject, object, action and attribute variables, are annotated with semantic information using 
the Access Control Oriented Ontology System (ACOOS) and some syntax elements are added such as priority 
and confidentiality. This approach can solve the problem of semantic interoperability and mutual understanding 
on the distributed access control policies of resources when cross organizational is involved. However, it is 
mentioned that this approach does not provide automatic conflict resolution for rules or policies and semantics-
based access control mechanism for variable granularity [56]. 
M .H. Diallo et al. [57] proposed an approach that extends middleware by incorporating CloudProtect, 
Cloudprotect stores user’s application data in encrypted form. It protects privacy of user’s application data. Some 
application requires access to the data in plain text format. Therefore it is cumbersome to encrypt and decrypt 
data. CloudProtect maintains the policies defining which data should be in plaintext form and which data should 
be encrypted on server. The policies are defined based user behavior. It offers key management and secure 
sharing of data. However, it is mentioned that the feasibility of this approach is not analyzed for Cloud 
applications. 
 
Otherkey security issues at application level are Service Availability and Integrity of workload state.    
3.1.1. Service availability 
Temporary or permanent loss of services and DoS/DDoS attacks are main threats affecting availability of 
Cloud services. For better QoS, services should be available as promised when they are requested. There are few 
incidents reported in literature. Database cluster failure caused at Salesforce.com [23]. In 2011 (February 27), 
Gmail goes down for few hours and due to service disruption, 0.29% of Gmail users affected and lost their 
previous emails and other data [24]. On 28th March 2011, thousands of users registered at Intuit company (which 
offers financial and tax preparation software and related services) were experienced an outage for 2 to 5 days 
during change in network configuration and scheduled maintenance. As a result, customers were blocked to 
access offered services [24].To address such issue, proper configuration of an IDS/IPS can be investigated. 
3.1.2. Integrity of workload state 
The integrity for state of a workload should be preserved to ensure expected results. Applications involving 
workflows are required to store temporary results of computation at different levels. There is no standard 
mechanism used to secure such sensitive files. If these sensitive files are disclosed to attacker, he/she may be able 
to threaten the expected behavior of application. A provenance based approach [25] can be used for securing 
application data flow among different sites. This approach provides confidentiality and integrity for data flow 
processing applications. As shown in Fig. 4 [25], composer (C) encrypts information regarding flow of data. At 
each hop (S1) decrypts the next hop’s (S2) information and send data. Here, a single hop cannot see the whole 
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topology. Malicious hop cannot be able to exploit entire flow of data. This approach can be used to provide a 
solution for integrity of data flow application delivery in Cloud. 
 
 
Fig. 4.Dataflow processing in provenance based approach [25]. 
3.2. Network Level Security Issues 
Network is the backbone of Cloud and hence vulnerabilities in network directly affect the security of Cloud. 
As shown in Fig. 5, security issues at network level should be considered in terms of both external and internal 
networks. An Adversary outside the Cloud network often performs DoS or DDoS attacks to affect the availability 
of Cloud services and resources. DoS/DDoS attacks reduce the bandwidth and increases the congestion causing 
poor service to the users. Due to distributed nature of Cloud, it is hard to prevent DoS/DDoS and Economic 
Denial of Sustainability (EDoS can be called as HTTP and XML based DDoS) [58] attacks.  
Fig. 5.An abstract view of network layer threat model for Cloud. 
Some common attacks at network layer are DNS poisoning attack, Sniffer attack, Port scanning, Cross site 
scripting, ARP spoofing, IP spoofing and phishing attack, which are executed to gain access of Cloud resources. 
Internal network attacker (authorized users or users within cloud network) can easily get access to other user’s 
resources without being detected. An insider has higher privileges and knowledge (related to network, security 
mechanism and resources to attack) than the external attacker. Therefore, it is easy for an insider to penetrate an 
attack than external attackers. Major security issues at network level include vulnerabilities in Internet protocols, 
authorization and authentication, intrusions, backdoor attack, session hijacking and clear data transmission. To 
address some of the issues at network level, major Cloud providers (like Amazon, Window Azure, Rack Space, 
Eucalyptus etc.)are running their applications behind firewall. However, it only provides security at boundary of 
network and cannot detect internal attacks. Network based intrusion detection system (NIDS) can be integrated to 
address some of the security issues. However, an NIDS should be configured for detecting external intrusions as 
well as internal intrusions. It should be also capable of detecting intrusions from encrypted traffic. In following, 
we see the existing research efforts to address network security issues in Cloud. 
Through experiments and implementation, authors in [26] surveyed about the security solutions that can be 
applied to detect ARP spoofing attacks. They concluded that XArp 2 [27] tool is an efficient security solution that 
can accurately detect ARP spoofing attacks.In [59], we discussed existing NIDS approaches to Cloud. For 
example, C. C. Lo et al. [28] introduced a snort based intrusion detection system framework for Cloud system. As 
shown in Fig. 6 [28],an IDS module is installed on each region of Cloud environment. If an intrusion is detected 
at any region, it alerts other regions by using cooperative agent. Other regions cooperatively compute severity of 
that and then differentiate it as an attack or normal activity based on a threshold.  
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Fig. 6. Block diagram of cooperative agent based approach [28]. 
This approach is suitable for preventing Cloud system from single point of failure caused by DDoS attack. 
However, it needs substantial computational effort. A. Bakshi and Yogesh [29] proposed a method to secureVMs 
in Cloud from DDoS attack using an IDS. In this approach, snort based NIDS tool is installed on VM. If any 
suspicious activity is detected, it notifies the source IP of that activity and blocks packets coming from that IP. If 
DDoS attack is found, it transfers the service running on affected VM to another VM and blocks all the packets. 
Mazzariello et al. [60] presented Snort based misuse detection in open source Eucalyptus Cloud environment.  
In this approach, Snort is deployed at a primary controller managing cloud instances called cloud controller as 
well as on the physical machines (hosting virtual machines) to detect intrusions coming from external networks. 
This approach solves the problem of deploying multiple instances of IDS. Although it is a fast and cost effective 
solution, it can only detect known attacks since only Snort is involved.  
Sandaret al. [58] introduced a new type of DDoS attack, called Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) in 
Cloud services and proposed a solution framework for EDoS protection. EDoS attack can be called as HTTP and 
XML based DDoS attack. EDoSprotection framework uses firewall and puzzle server to detect EDoS attack. A 
firewall is used to detect EDoS at the entry point of Cloud, whereas the puzzle server is used to authenticate the 
user. In this work, the authors demonstrated EDoS attack in the Amazon EC2 Cloud. However, it is not an 
efficient solution since it uses only traditional firewalls. Research is still needed to detect EDoS attacks in the 
Cloud. 
F. Y. Lueet. al [30] integrate an intrusion detection system into a Grid, which uses existing grid resources for 
detecting strong DDoS attacks. In this approach, traffic from multiple switches is collected by multiple 
dispatchers and is sent for intrusion detection using scheduler. Scheduler forwards that traffic to intrusion 
detector, if load on any detector is low. This solution is used to overcome possible performance bottlenecks and 
deals with the distribution of load which requires several nodes to be utilized. 
To overcome limitations existing in above presented approaches, further work related to NIDS is needed to 
provide fully secure network environment in Cloud. One another challenging problem related to Cloud-NIDS is 
the monitoring and capturing network traffic. This is due to the multi-tenancy and distributed nature of Cloud 
computing. 
3.3. Data Storage Level Security Issues 
Following aspects of data security are still open challenges: Data-in-transit, Data-at-rest, Data Lineage, Data 
Remanence, Data Provenance, Data Recovery, Data location, Data breaches and investigative support. 
In case of data-in-transit, adversary in network affects the confidentiality and integrity of data. The biggest 
risks for data-in-transit include poor encryption technology and network protocols. Simply going for an 
encryption technology does not serve the purpose. 
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Data at rest (stored in Cloud storage) need physical, logical and personnel access control policies. Some 
examples related to Cloud failures on data security are: Data center of Hosting.com at New jersey went down for 
few hours due to software bug in a Cisco switch [24] (June 2010). Amazon’s EC2 and RDS services have 
experienced an outage for 4 days (April 2011). Amazon reported that its Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes are 
trapped, which affected to EC2 instances trying to use affected volumes [31]. Data at rest (stored in Cloud 
storage) is generally commingled with other users’ data. Even after using techniques to prevent unauthorized 
access, data at rest can be compromised through exploitation of application vulnerabilities. The main 
problemwith data-at-rest in thecloud is loss of control, if a non-authorized user accesses the data in a shared 
environment. Storage devices with in-built encryption techniques failed to prevent unauthorized access since the 
encryption and decryption keys can be compromised by malicious user. A lockbox approach, wherein the actual 
keys are stored in a lockbox and there is a separate key to access that lockbox can be used in the above mentioned 
case. However, again there is a need for security of lockbox key. This poses key management issue. 
Data lineage. Tracing the data path is known as data lineage and it is important for auditing purpose in the 
cloud. It is a challenging task to provide data lineage. Since the data flow is no longer linear in a virtualized 
environment within the cloud, it complicates the process of mapping the data flow to ensure integrity of the data. 
Due to shared environment, maintaining the integrity of data is the most challenges task is Cloud.  
Data-Remanence refers to the data left out in case of data transferor data removal. It causes minimal security 
threats viz; disclosure of sensitive information, data sold to others etc.  
Data recovery is the one the most challenging problems. Data can be lost due to accidental damage or natural 
disaster to storage. It poses risk to data availability for users. 
Data location. Tracing location of data is difficult in Cloud since user’s data are dynamically migrated from 
one region (or country) to another region (or country). It increases risk of data privacy and security since data 
owner loses the control over his/her data.  
Data breaches and investigative support: It is difficult to investigate inappropriate or illegal activity, because 
logging and data for multiple customers are co-located and may also be spread across an ever-changing set of 
hosts and data centers. 
D. Lin et al. [32] proposed a data protection framework that is composed of three modules named policy 
ranking, policy integration and policy enforcement. Policy ranking module is used to find satisfying users’ 
privacy policy requirements. For policy ranking module, there are three models recommended: (i) User-oriented 
ranking model; (ii) Service-provider-oriented ranking model; and (iii) Broker based ranking model. After finding 
the best service provider, proposed centralized model (for policy integration module) creates policies to be agreed 
by involving parties. Finally policy enforcement module (uses either tight coupling or loose coupling) examines 
whether confidentiality of data and policies are guaranteed at any time and at any location or not. 
M. Mowbray et al. [34] proposed a client based privacy manager, incorporated features like obfuscation, 
preference settings, data access, feedback and personae. Obfuscation is used to modify some data fields of 
database before sending it to Cloud for processing. So, an attacker using same application would be unable to 
reveal those data. Only owners of those data can de-obfuscate those data. Using preference settings, set of policy 
can be incorporated for those data. Policies and data are shared with sender and receiver using cryptographic 
techniques. Data access will allow users to access personal information for checking accuracy or any violation of 
privacy. Feedback module monitors personal data transferring from platform and manages feedback including 
usage of personal data in Cloud. Personae module offers choice for revealing or not revealing different data 
fields. Data privacy is fully dependent on data owner. 
J. Naruchitparames et al. [63] proposed a blind processing service using trusted computing mechanism to 
provide improved privacy and integrity for user’s data. Blind processing is used create a secure channel between 
dedicated processes that are concealed from the rest of the system including root processes, system 
administrators, and end-users. This approach provides several layers of abstraction in which a remote system is 
ensured to have correct hardware, a trusted computing base, correct credentials, and a trustworthy state. However, 
it requires more hardware for processing. Practical analysis of this approach is not reported. 
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M. R. Abbasy et al. [64] proposed an approach that hides sensitive data using DNA reference sequences. In 
this approach, first data are converted from binary to DNA Nucleotides sequences for encrypting data. Then, 
complementary rules on encrypted data are applied. After that index of each couple of Nucleotides in DNA 
reference sequence are found. These sequences contain encrypted data. For decrypting these data, same 
procedure is followed in bottom-up manner. This approach provides security and privacy of user’s data in 
resource sharing environment. However, if DNA sequence is altered or modified, it is difficult to retrieve original 
data. 
S. J. Stolfo et al. [65] proposed an approach that uses user behavior and decoy information to mitigate insider 
data theft. In this approach, data access patterns are monitored by profiling user behavior. Decoy documents that 
are stored in the Cloud along with the user’s real data act as sensors to detect illegitimate access. When 
unauthorized access is found, it is verified using challenge questions. 
3.4. Virtualization Level Security Issues 
In the virtualized (multi-tenant) environment, multiple OSs run concurrently on a host computer using 
hypervisor. Existing vulnerabilities [6] in VM that are distributed throughout the physical and virtual enterprise 
resources allow cyber attacker, malware, or other threats to remotely exploit.VMs’ collocation also increases the 
security risk. In general, an attacker exploits these vulnerabilities be able to threaten the security of Cloud. 
As the number of Guest operating systems (OSs) running on a hypervisor increase, the security concerns with 
that newer guest OSs also increase. Because it is not possible to keep track of all guest OSs and hence 
maintaining the security of those OSs is difficult. It may happen that a guest system tries to run a malicious code 
on the host system and bring the system down or take full control of the system and block access to other guest 
OSs. There are risks associated with sharing the same physical infrastructure between a set of multiple users, 
even one being malicious can cause threats to the others using the same infrastructure.   
If a hacker is able to get control over the hypervisor, he can make changes to any of the guest Oss and get 
control over all the data passing through the hypervisor. Isolation between two VMs is not completely adequate 
by current virtual machine monitors (VMMs). By compromising the lower layer hypervisor vulnerabilities, 
attacker can gain control over installed VMs. E.g. Bluepill, SubVirt and DKSM are some well-known attacks on 
virtual layer. This is still an open problem to prevent such threats. 
Virtualization based malware and rootkit: New generation of rootkits that benefit from the processor 
technology that allows attacker to insert an additional hypervisor between the hardware and the software. The 
hypervisor takes control of the system and converts the original operating system into a virtual guest on the fly. In 
contrast to software-based virtualization, this kind of hijacking does not need a restart, and that makes it all the 
more difficult to detect the intrusion.  
Sharing of VM images in Cloud introduces security risks. The owner of an image is concerned about 
confidentiality (e.g., unauthorized accesses to the image). The user of an image is concerned about safety (e.g., a 
malicious image that is capable of corrupting or stealing the user's own private data). For example, instances 
running on Amazon’s EC2 platform can be easiliy compromized by performing various attacks like signature-
wrapping attack,cross site scripting (XSS) attackDoS attack.This allowsattackers to create, modify and delete VM 
images, and change administrative passwords and settingsthat are put into instances with EC2 for S3 
access.There is a risk of non-compliance (e.g., running unlicensed software or software with expired licenses). 
The administrator of Cloud is concerned with the security and compliance of the Cloud as a whole and the 




There should be standard mechanism for checking integrity of guest VMsfor successfully executing workload 
and avoiding interruption of computation, data loss and misuse of resources. As shown in Fig. 7 [36], host based 
transparentCloud protection system (TCPS) monitors integrity of Cloud components.TCPS is placed between 
guest’skernel and the virtualization layers, which monitors guest VMs and protects them against intruders and 
attacks. It also addresses transparency problem in Cloud. 
Fig. 7.Architecture of TCPS [36]. 
 
Authors in [37] provided solution for securing virtual image repository and access control. As shown in Fig. 8, 
access control mechanism is used to reduce risk of unauthorized access to publisher’s VM images. Image filters 
are used to remove user’s personal information for providing privacy at publishing and retrieving time, where 
tracking system is used to disable malicious attempts by tracing versions of image and their operations. Also, 
















A.Volokyta et al. [66] proposed a mechanism of monitoring of virtual machines to increase security of Cloud 
resources that can be affected by attacks. Using a detector, Host OS is monitored for integrity checking. All the 
malicious activities are analyzed by this detector and logged into log file. Using periodic checksum verification 
of executable file and libraries, integrity of Cloud resources are checked by virtual machine monitor (VMM). In 
this approach, all the monitoring activities are done through VMM. However, if hypervisor (or VMM) is 
compromised, guest OSs (running on that VMM) can be compromised.  
3.5. Authentication and Access Control Level Security Issues 
In Cloud computing, the client’s information is transmitted over the Internet, which poses data ownership 
issues [36]. As this information is processed outside the enterprise, it brings inherent level of risk. 
This issue is addressed by providing support for security assertion markup language (SAML) federation 
protocol (which contains authentication credentials in the form of SAML assertions) with their own 
authentication protocol [38]. SAML is issued to exchange information, such as assertions related to a subject or 
authentication information between cooperating domains. The request and response messages of it are mapped 
over Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) relying on XML. As discussed in section 3.1, using a Signature 
Wrapping Attack, it is possible to modify an eavesdropped message despite of it beingdigitally signed. Thus, an 
attacker may be able to execute arbitrary machine commands on behalf of a legitimate user. To address such 
issues, data should be transmitted via secured channel, fine-grained authentication and authorization techniques 
can be used for preventing data from unauthorized access. 
L. Yan et al. [67] proposed an authentication approach that uses federated identity management together with 
hierarchical identity-based cryptography (HIBC). It provides key (public key and private key) distribution along 
with mutual authentication between parties in Cloud. It allows users to access services from other Cloud with 
single digital identity. For web services, this approach can be used to distribute public keys, while reducing 
SOAP header size. It is used to create session between two parties without message exchange. However, it 
creates trust issues since third party key distribution is involved.  
A.Celesti et al. [68] addressed identity management problem in inter cloud. In this approach, third party is 
used as identity provider (IDP). In order to communicate, each cloud has to create an account using ID provided 
by IDP. Each cloud performs authentication task on provided ID to establish a trust and gains the access of 
needed resources. Trust on foreign cloud is accomplished by the IDP. The limitation of this approach is that each 
Cloud has to trust and rely on identity provider. Experimental evaluations are not reported. 
  
20 
To solve third party problem, R. Ranchal et al. [69] proposed an approach to protect identity information 
without including trusted third party and using active bundle scheme. In this approach, Samir’s multi party 
secrete sharing scheme is used to encrypt data.  In this scheme, encrypted data and keys are shared among 
multiple hosts. By computing predicate over encrypted data and multiparty computing, active bundle based 
authentication can be done without decrypting data. 
Fine-grained access controls should be available for controlling access to sensitive data or application code. 
Security group is able to define a setof controls applied to applications depending on the data. 
For controlling access to Cloud resources, standards like eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) expressing access policies can be used. Service providers like Salesforce and Google Apps are using 
XACML for authorization decision and access control. Authors in [39] presented security model for restricting 
access to information through covert channels in Cloud. The solution for identity management among Clouds is 
presented in [40]. According to proposed protocol in [40], Cloud user registers his/her ID with service provider 
and gets a certificate with public key. Then third party service Cloud and service providers send their certificate 
to each other. While requesting to third party service Cloud, user can verify its certificate. After that, messages 
for third party service Cloud and service provider Cloud are produced. In produced messages, service level 
information is hidden for service provider, whereas ID and privileges (IOMD as shown in Fig.9) are hidden for 
third party service Cloud. For hiding such information, dual signatures(produced by hash function and encryption 
using user’s private key) are used. Thus, disclosure of user’s ID and privileges can be protected from service 
providers. 
 
Fig. 9.(a)Dual signature procedure (b) Service verification [40]. 
 
A re-encryption approach (as shown in Fig. 10[41]) provides flexible access control mechanism in Cloud data 
storage. Here, data owner (Down) (who provides data to service provider) generates private key and public key 
using private key generator (PKG) for each user of these data. Then re-encryption keys corresponding to private 
key for each user are generated using key generator (REKG) and stored into authentication table. After that 
access control policies are stored in access control matrix. Using public key of each user, each tuple of owned 
database is encrypted. Authorization table is encrypted using public key of database services provider (DSP). 
Encrypted database and authorization table are transferred to DSP. By using re-encryption keys, DSP re-encrypts 
tuples of database. Produced re-cipher text is decrypted only by legal user’s private key. Thus, DSP can authorize 
data users without seeing data. 
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Fig. 10. Re-encryption based approach [41]. 
 
V. Echeverria et al. [70] proposed an idea to control an access of user data in Cloud; that is called Permission 
as a Service. It separates access control from other services to provide a separate service in the cloud. This allows 
users to set permissions for all data in a single location. This approach provides confidentiality of user’sby 
encrypting them using attribute based encryption (ABE) to provide data confidentiality. When any user wants to 
access this data, permissions to access this data are managed via decryption keys. However, this approach is 
applied only for PaaS. 
E. E. Mon et al. [71] combined Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-based Access Control 
(ABAC) to provide the privacy and security of sensitive data of cloud users. In this approach, Cloud clients store 
their data based on privacy laws according to their user levels. With the use of RBAC and ABAC, the privacy 
manager defines the privacy policies, privacy laws, user levels and security levels to control data access. Using an 
access control list (ACL), users are granted or denied to access the data. In this approach, security and privacy 
policies are defined by service providers, which restrict users to store all type of data since service providers are 
not fully trusted.   
D. Slamanig [72] presented a dynamic accumulator based approach for privacy preserving access control to 
outsourced data. In this approach, the concept of access control lists (ACLs) is used to provide permissions (read, 
write, delete) to other users who are able to unlinkably and anonymously perform operations on outsourced data 
items when having these permissions. Using this approach, it can be decided that whether the users are allowed to 
system or not. Data user can give/get access rights to/from other users, whereas Cloud provider will not be able to 
identify such users and linked operations done by users. The limitation of this approach is that if data owner want 
to revoke permission from user, then that user must have to revoke granted permission from other users. This 
makes computationally difficult to maintain chain of users.  
M. Raykova et al. [73] proposed privacy enhanced access control for outsourced data. In this approach, 
authors combine coarse-grained access control and fine-grained cryptographic access control. Coarse-grained 
access control offers an affordable communication overhead and provides privacy of information against view of 
the access rules and the access patterns, whereas fine-grained cryptographic access control is used at the user’s 
side, which provides the desired access control policies. This approach offers read and write access control to 
user’s data.  
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3.6. Trust Level Security Issues 
This is one of the serious problems in Cloud. Since users have lack of control over resources, they have to rely 
on trust mechanisms and contracts in conjunction with mechanisms that provide a compensation. But trust is a 
very fuzzy concept and very difficult to calculate in a heterogeneous environment that is assessed by human or 
social trust. Contractors may be sub-contracting without user’s knowledge. That means limiting visibility of 
network and system monitoring to user poses a trust issue. Contract requirements may not be propagated down 
the sub contracts. Employees (authorized users) or malicious insiders of organization often perform attacks that 
affect the confidentiality and privacy of other users’ data as well as resources. Lack of public relations poses trust 
issue. Data Processing outside the organization poses inherent level of risk. There is no direct control on some 
service components outside the organization. Limiting visibility of network and system monitoring to user may 
also pose a trust issue. This issue can be addressed by providing adequate means of visibility of monitoring 
system. There should be mechanism for managing and assessing theinvolved risk. Cross-site scripting, access 
control weaknesses, insecure storage, and insecure configuration are some of the threat examples. Advanced 
cryptography techniques and signature technique can be used to address trust issue when outsourcing data. 
Authors in [42] presented approach for verifying dynamic data and securing data storage against adversary. Using 
this approach, users can check correctness of their data in Cloud storage with minimum overhead. Also, it 
protects users’ data against any failure and locates data errors. 
3.7. Security Issues related to Auditing, Regulatory Compliance and Laws 
Audit and compliance to internal processes and external processes must be met with classified requirement 
and customer agreements, laws and regulations. Therefore, such policies should be monitored. Multi-tenancy 
nature of Cloud increases the difficulty of monitoring and log process of VM.Due to dynamic nature of Cloud, it 
is difficult to audit and compliance with coordination of external auditing, regulatory compliance and internal 
policy compliance. Risks related to compliance are discussed as follows: 
Privacy Compliance: Only owners of data are responsible for the security and privacy of their outsourced data 
even if the data is held by service provider. This is due to the various laws and regulations in different countries. 
It poses risk of data security, confidentiality and availability. This is an open problem for providing transparency 
and controlled environment to owners about their data. 
Geographic Compliance: If the tenant or cloud customer operates in the United States, Canada or the European 
Union, they are subject to numerous regulatory requirements. These include Control Objectives for Information 
and related Technology. These laws might relate to where the data is stored or transferred, as well as how well 
this data is protected from a confidentiality aspect. 
Most of the cloud-based services have lengthy and onerous license agreements that very few businesses and 
consumers read or understand in their entirety. As a result, cloud services are often controlled by terms and 
conditions that limit a user’s right of control and access or give the cloud service certain rights over the user’s 
own data. 
Industry Compliance: Industry compliance considerations are typically seen as an area where many cloud 
migrations flounder. Typical regulatory requirements can include:Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
(PCI-DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Trusted Internet Connections 
(TIC) compliance. 
Placing geographical and other restrictions on the collection, processing and transfer of personally identifiable 
information (PII) and sensitive information limit the usage of Cloud services. Privacy laws in various countries 
limit organizations to transfer some type of information to other countries. E.g.,UK businesses storing personal 
data with Cloud provider like Salesforce on the basis of their standard terms and conditions could find themselves 
in breach ofUK data protection law [43]. In Asia-Pacific (APAC) region, Japan,Australia and many other 
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countries have implemented data protection laws which require reasonable measures to protect privacy of 
personal data based on security guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) privacy framework [44]. In Europe, the European 
Economic Area (EEA) has enacted data protection laws that follow the European data protection directives 
[44].A set of standards [45] like HIPAA, SOX, FDA, PCI, FISMA, GLBA, OSHA, ISO 27002, Basel II etc. 
should be implemented in Cloud to address compliance issue. There is a need to frame unified regulatory 
compliance.  
Multi-Tenancy applications often require modifying existing applications and introducing newer modifications 
in application programs. In [75], the authors proposed a platform running on top of LAMP architecture for 
increased stability and security. Their platform does not need modification in current application stack. 
In [76], the authors proposed an architecture for self-protecting documents by encapsulating security 
components like access control and usage control for achieving automatic document architecture for enterprise 
Digital Rights Management [e-DRM]. 
In [77], the authors proposed an approach to ensure reliability of data using Sobol Sequence and utilizing 
token pre consumption. Their analysis show that the proposed scheme is more secure against Byzantine failure, 
unauthorized data modification attacks, and even cloud server colluding attacks than existing systems  
S. Bleikertz et al. [74] proposed a way for visualization and automated analysis based on reachability and 
attack graphs. In this approach, proposed query and policy language is used to analyze security configuration. It 
can be used to test the correctness of security policies (defined in Cloud) to trace the attack. However, it audits 
only firewall rules for Cloud to assure users that their environment is protected. It does not provide ability to 
Cloud users to control their own resources at the Cloud and assure them about the trustworthiness of Cloud 
environment. 
B. Wang et al. [61] proposed an approach called Oruta (One ring to rule them all)), that provides a new 
privacy-preserving public auditing mechanism for shared data in an untrusted cloud. In this approach, third party 
auditor is used, that uses ring signatures to build homomorphic authenticators to verify the integrity of the shared 
data for a static group of users without retrieving the entire data. However, it is not an efficient solution, when 
user groups are dynamic. Time taken to verify information increases linearly with the number of users increases 
in a group.  
M.T. Khorshed [62] surveyed on the gaps that is slowing down cloud adoption and reviewed challenges on 
threat remediation. In this work, author investigated and compared performances of several machine learning 
techniques to monitor insider activities in Cloud and concluded that rule based technique C4.5 (decision tree 
classifier) is an efficient technique to solve problem of monitoring the insiders’ activities having similar patterns 
as some other cyber attacks. 
 
 
Table 4 summarizes security issues at different levels in Cloud environment. 
Security measures adopted by major Cloud providers are summarized in Table 5 [46][47][48]. 
4. Future Research Directions 
There are upcoming Cloud models that require newer research directives: 
4.1. Mobile Cloud Computing 
Mobile Cloud computing is confined to availability of Cloud computing to mobile ecosystem. These can also 
be extended to tablets and portable PDAs having limited processing and memory capabilities. Besides uniform 
network stability and device access, mobile devices raise several security and privacy concerns; an obvious case 
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is misplacement or loss of a mobile device that can result into major data breach. There is a lack of platform 
independent languages to develop applications for mobile devices, i.e. consistent case for Android and Apple.. 
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Table 4.Summary of security issues with their mitigation directives. 







 A provenance based approach 
[25].  DDoS attack detection for 
securing VM [29].  Semantic access control [56].  CloudProtect [57]. 
 Before deploying applications, they should be tested and made 
free from vulnerabilities like buffer overflow, SQL injection etc.  Strong authentication and access control.  Provide browser and API level security.  Implement IDS/IPS for service availability.  Implement secure software development life cycle. 
Integrity of 
workload state 
Network level security issues  Various IDS/IPS approaches 
[28] [30].  EDoS Protection [58]. 






Data protection  Anonymity based technique for 
data privacy [33].  Client based privacy manager 
[34].  Policy ranking based approach 
[32].  Data hiding approach [64].  Fog Computing [65]. 
 Provide browser and API level security, use SSL encryption for 
transmission of data.  Use standard SLAs, periodic audits required.  Provide abstract level transparency for migrated data.  Implement database intrusion detection.  Use secure data backups and recovery protocols.  Data isolation required.  Homomorphic encryption technique can be incorporated to 










Virtualization level security 
issues 
 Protection against Intra host 
attacks [36].  Virtual machine introspection 
based IDS approach [35].  Providing privacy for virtual 
image repository [37].  Secure virtualization [66]. 
 Virtual machines should be isolated and any breach in VM’s 
isolation should be alerted.  Ensure integrity and security of virtual machine images.  Virtual machine manager should be free from vulnerabilities.  Use firewall, host based IDS/IPS, network based IDS/IPS, 
antivirus for virtualized operating system. These measures should 
be transferred to each guest machine. 
Authentication and 
authorization level security  
 Restricting search and Access 
control [39].  Identity management based 
approach [40].  RE-Encryption based approach 
[41].  Permission as a service [70]. 
 Use standards like SAML, encrypted SSL, XACML etc.  Use proper firewall to control access.  Use public key infrastructure solutions.  Identity based encryption, policy based encryption or attribute 
based encryption techniques can be used.   Define access control policies and use proper SLAs. 
Trust level security issues  Data storage security [42].  Provide certain transparency to data owner.  Use strong authentication and access control mechanism.  Provide periodic audits to data owners for their data.  Provide certain visibility of security system to data owners.   
Security issues related to 
Audit, Regulatory compliance 
and laws 
 Available standards: HIPAA, 
SOX, FDA, PCI, FISMA, 
GLBA, OSHA, ISO 27002, 
Basel II [45].  Security audits for virtual 




infrastructure [74].  Insider activity monitoring [76]. 
 
 
Table 5.Security measures adopted by major Cloud providers 
Cloud Provider Services 
offered 
Security measures adopted 
Amazon AWS PaaS 
IaaS 
 Amazon EC2 provides web service interface to configure firewall settings, which controls network 
access between groups of users.  Amazon simple storage service (S3) is accessible via SSL encrypted end points. It is user’s 
responsibility to encrypt data before storing into S3. 
Google App 
Engine 
PaaS  JVM in a secured “sandbox” environment is used for running Java Applications, which isolate 
applications and security. Any executable Java byte code can be operated within the sandbox 
controls.  In addition, Python interpreter is running in a secured “sandbox” that isolates applications and 
security. 
Window Azure PaaS 
IaaS 
 Firewalls, filtering routers, cryptographic protection of messages, software security patch 
management, central monitoring, correlation and analysis systems, network segmentation, Service 
administration access and physical security.  Reduces the damage to infrastructure by providing optional and mandatory “sandbox” features.  Customers are provided security options as available in window server. Configuration and updates are 
controlled by SSL client certificates and protected by 128 bit encryption.  All administrative operations are audited. 
Force.com PaaS  For authentication, SAML is used on login, session security and auditing.  Security at various levels such as Physical security, logical network security, host security, 
transmission level security and database security are provided. 
Rack Space IaaS  Firewalls, antivirus and spam protection provided.  SSL provided as add on service. 
Go Grid IaaS  ServePath’s secure infrastructure and telecom facility provided. 
Joyent Inc. PaaS 
IaaS 





IaaS  Access restrictions are provided through firewalls. Front-end protection against DDoS attack. 
Terremark 
worldwide Inc. 




IaaS  VLAN for each customer.  Data is stored in a T1 storage back end. 
Eucalyptus IaaS  WS-security for authentication, public key and private key for users. 
Open Nebula IaaS  Firewall and virtual private network tunnel used. 
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Nimbus IaaS  PKI credentials are required. 
 
4.2. Encryption and Key management algorithms 
Unknown physical location of data in the Cloud and different laws enforced by nations to manage data make 
encryption and key management complex. If encryption is applied, it needs to be performed at multiple locations. 
Within the data center, in between the data centers, or between public and private Clouds etc. There is a strong 
need of improved solution involving the users for controlling the use of their data. In [49], authors propose the 
use of symmetric key encryption mechanism for data security in Cloud framework. In [50], authors propose the 
use of Public Key Infrastructure for the Cloud framework. However, these approaches do not provide an efficient 
solution for key management due to its complexity. Identity Based approach has to overcome the key 
management limitation. However, there is a need of more robust approach in this context, which could extend 
traditional approaches like Cipher text Policy Attribute based encryption (CPABE) [51], Key Policy Attribute 
based encryption (KPABE) etc. to Cloud computing. 
4.3. Ad-Hoc Clouds 
Current Model of Cloud computing involves a data center approach, whereby clusters of machines are 
dedicated to running Cloud infrastructure software. However, there may be some resources whose utilization has 
been limited. A model called ‘Ad hoc Cloud’ [52] enables infrastructure software to be distributed over resources 
harvested from machines already in existence within the enterprise. This may in turn yields several benefits such 
as reduction of need for the specialized infrastructure for resilience. However, this approach would require newer 
architectural representations, membership control mechanism for set of machines for ad-hoc Clouds and newer 
model for maintaining scalability. Apart from these, there are moreopen areas for further research andrequire 
notable attention. These may include delivery of newer services like high performance computing, implementing 
a secure Virtual Private Network over the Cloud, Security as a Service etc. These concepts are still in their 
infancy and its adoption and extension to Cloud computing would require considerable research efforts. 
5. Conclusions 
Cloud computing can bring various business benefits to organizations. However, there are many 
challengesrelated to security and privacy. Our attempt is to show various vulnerabilities, threats and attacks 
hindering the adoption of Cloud computing. We surveyed existing solutions to address security issues at different 
layer of Cloud, while identifying some open problems. It opens up space for future researchto extend existing 
techniques and to investigate new techniques for security and privacy to mobile Cloud and ad-hoc Cloud. This 
includes a need for a dynamic security model and better crypto (and key management) algorithms that targets 
different levels of security and privacy for Cloud computing. 
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